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LI ZEHOU'S AESTHETICS 
AS A MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM 
ABSTRACT 
Despite his status as one of the most prominent Chinese intellectuals living outside 
of China, Li Zehou remains an unapologetic Marxist. He also lays enthusiastic claim to 
his Chinese philosophical heritage. This seemingly paradoxical tryst of ideologies is 
becoming increasingly common in China, in no small part through the influence of this 
philosopher-without portfolio. Li is no grandstander, however-it was his 500 page 
tome on Kant, A Critique of the Critical Philosophy, that first caught the public's atten-
tion in 1979 and quickly became the talk of intellectual circles. According to Li, the key 
to his now expansive oeuvre is his theory of aesthetics. After being largely unknown to 
non-sinophobe aestheticians, Li's ideas are gradually being translated into English, but 
very little has been done on his aesthetics. In the first of three sections of this paper, I 
introduce the reader to Kant's aesthetics through Li's eyes, in which he develops an 
implicit notion of aesthetic freedom as political vehicle through the notions of subjectiv-
ity, universalization, and the unity of the cognitive faculties. In the second section, I 
introduce Marx's notions of "human nature as practice" and "freedom as practice", as 
outlined in his early manuscripts. I conclude that Marx's politics take free practice as 
the highest expression of humanity, which is finally, ideally, self-legislating. In the final 
section, I present Li's interpretation of Marx as a remedy for Kant, introducing some of 
Li's specialized vocabulary and demonstrating his final synthesis of Kant and Marx in a 
notion of aesthetic freedom that presupposes political freedom. 
Key words: Chinese philosophy; freedom; Kant, I.; Marx, K.; Marxism; subjectal-
ity. 
Despite his status as one of the most prominent Chinese intellectuals living 
outside of China, Li Zehou remains an unapologetic Marxist. He also lays en-
thusiastic claim to his Chinese philosophical heritage. This seemingly paradoxi-
cal tryst of ideologies is becoming increasingly common in China, primarily 
through the influence of this philosopher-without-portfolio. Li is no grand-
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stander, however-it was his 500 page tome on Kant that first caught the public's 
attention in 1979 and quickly became the talk of intellectual circles. According 
to Li, the key to his now expansive oeuvre is his theory of aesthetics. 
Even today in China, it is almost impossible for a philosopher to be politi-
cally neutral, and Li is no exception. Li's major work, A Critique of the Critical 
Philosophy (Pipan Zhexue de Pipan :Jtl)¥1J:fs*a1t!tflJ), never makes any 
overtly critical statements of the government. It is a Marxist interpretation of 
Kant's critical philosophy, supplementing Kant with Marxist theory where Li 
finds Kant lacking. Nevertheless, Li's philosophy, despite its being Marxist, 
would bear out the favoring of a liberalization of the government party struc-
ture, in fact implies them quite strongly, if we are willing to look. According to 
Woei Lien Chang's interpretation of Li's work, 
[t]he Kantian epistemology has implications which are subversive to all au-
thority [ ... ]: if reality is a construct of our own categories, then there is no 
ground for claims to omnipotence, omniscience, or a monopoly on absolute 
truth-claims clearly implied in the way the Chinese Communist Party exer-
cises its power. 1 
To this I would add that even Li's Marxist interpretation of Kant is potentially 
subversive. The Marx that Li invokes, after all, is not the Marx of Capital or of 
the Communist Manifesto, but the 26 year-old Marx who is working out a radical 
theory of human nature that takes emancipation beyond communism as its ulti-
mate goal. Freedom and its highest expression are what Li finds appealing in both 
Kant and Marx. In this paper I trace the arc of Li's aesthetic theory through Kant 
and Marx, with the aim of demonstrating that ultimately Li's concern is articulat-
ing a philosophy of aesthetic freedom, and therefore, of political freedom. 
In reinterpreting Kant, Li develops an implicit notion of aesthetic freedom as 
political vehicle through the notions of subjectivity, universalization, and the 
unity of the cognitive faculties. With his treatment of Marx, he stresses the no-
tions of "human nature as practice" and "freedom as practice", as outlined in 
Marx's early manuscripts. Finally, Li interprets Marx as a remedy for Kant, 
introducing his own specialized vocabulary and offering a synthesis of Kant and 
Marx through a notion of aesthetic freedom that presupposes political freedom. 
KANT'S APPEAL 
For the purposes of conference paper brevity, I'll quickly summarize a few 
notions in Kant that Li finds attractive and then move on to the less familiar 
aesthetic notions of Marx. 
1 Woei Lien Chong, "Mankind and Nature in Chinese Thought: Li Zehou on the Traditional 
Roots of Maoist Voluntarism", China lnfonnation, vol. XI, nos. 2/3 (autumn/winter 1996), 
pp. 149-150. 
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First, Li turns to Kant to establish a firm separation of subjectivity and ob-
jectivity. Li notices that one of the great weaknesses of Chinese philosophy, 
from the beginnings right up to the present day, is a failure to clearly distinguish 
subject and object. In the Chinese one-world cosmology, this weakness ac-
counts, according to Li, for many of the ills of Chinese society, including the 
failure to develop empirical science and for the gross voluntarism that has de-
luded leaders right up and through Mao Zedong. His antidote is the Kantian 
subjectivity confined by the limits of the a priori structures of human under-
standing that actively and autonomously construct experience. Now the natural 
human bifurcation is achieved, and not only is nature there to be molded, but 
human power is limited by natural laws and by a priori principles. 
With this bifurcation safely in place, Li seeks a way back to the unities in 
Chinese thought, which he also sees as its distinctive strength. For this, he turns 
to Kant's notion of the judgment of taste, non-conceptual cognition, in which 
the cognitive powers of intuition, imagination, and understanding are in free 
play. When finally wrapping up aesthetical judgment at the end of Part One of 
the Critique, however, Kant reiterates the unity of the rational, the practical, and 
the aesthetic, but his appeal to the so-called supersensible substrate, a mysteri-
ous spiritual level that accounts for the universalizability of judgments, does not 
sit well with Li. Li is attracted to the idea of free play, as we'll see below, but to 
account for the unity in free-play, while staying within the bounds of material-
ism, Li turns to Marx. 
FREEDOM AND PRACTICE IN MARX 
It is indicative of Li's project that when turning to Marx he turns to his earli-
est work, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, which Marx himself 
never intended to be published (although some commentators have taken this 
work to be the true philosophical Marx, before he was sidetracked by purely 
political considerations). In an essay titled "Estranged Labor", Marx depicts the 
human being's non-alienated state, equating labor with life-activity, or produc-
tive life. He says that free, conscious life-activity is what distinguishes humans 
as species beings, what differentiates us from animals. Life as a part of a species 
is the natural condition of humans, and estrangement from it turns the laborer to 
individual life and its narrow concerns. Similar to Kant's formulation of socia-
bility as an innate human property, 2 it is by dint of being a species that humans 
are human, the human species implying human society. Marx does not address 
the topic of aesthetics, per se, but he speculates that humans, through practical 
activity, mold inorganic nature into a world of objects. In this way, they trans-
form nature into their own reality. Marx is explicit that genuine productive life 
is not a means to an end but free activity, so what else could it be but art-
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment,§ 41. 
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though the closest that Marx gets to saying it is, "Man therefore forms things in 
accordance with the laws of beauty".3 Alienation through forced labor (and all 
capitalist labor is forced labor), is to Marx the animalization of humans, the 
disenfranchisement of humans from their right to be human. The essence of 
being human lies in the free activity of production, again, presumably of art. 
In his essay, "Private Property and Communism", Marx offers an even clearer 
statement of the relationships among art, activity, and the unity of the reason (the 
rational and the practical) and sense (the aesthetic). Here, he outlines five stages 
of the dialectical transformation of communism, from the negation of private 
property to the highest form of existence of human as self-creator. In the first 
stage, humans realize that being human is their nature, which is, in effect, an evo-
lutionary statement. Animal nature becomes human nature through the long proc-
ess of human activities, so that one's human essence is one's natural essence, and 
in the case of humans, this is certainly a social essence. In the third stage (skip-
ping the second stage), a fully developed communism equated with both natural-
ism and humanism is presented as the ideal organization for human nature, be-
cause human nature has become inherently social. In the fourth stage, in which 
the human has become completely emancipated from private property, the human 
eye, all human senses, perceive the world in a strange, new way. No longer are 
there objects of alienation. The objects of the world, as perceived through human 
senses, social senses, become human, become social. All objects give themselves 
over to the human who is free of all desire of utility or utilitarian enjoyment, who 
perceives things as they are. All theoretical considerations are removed, and the 
rational becomes the practical through the senses. This is the stage that most re-
sembles the unification of cognitive powers as depicted by Kant. Yet here, subjec-
tivity is not drifting, is not a mind detached from a body, a soul in the ether. 
Rather, sensibility is made possible only through humanized nature. Human be-
ings, as they have developed, have created human nature, which has the capacity 
to view the world in a manner that unifies the purely rational, the practical, and 
the aesthetic. These, of course, are not Marx's exact words, but the meaning is 
clearly there, and Li Zehou capitalizes on it. 
The fifth stage depicts the transition from communism to socialism. In this 
stage, the independence of the human being is briefly considered. When com-
munism has outlived its usefulness, what is left? The human being is still social. 
And human society can now be structured out of the social constructs of the 
manifold human powers only, "from the practically and theoretically sensuous 
consciousness of man and nature as the essence". 4 Granted, Marx's wording is 
3 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated by Martin Milligan 
(New York: International Publishers 1964), p. 114. 
4 Ibid., p. 146. Li takes this as an explicit statement about art. We must remember that to both 
Marx and Li, there does not seem to be a clear dividing line between art, practice, and other free 
life-activities. We could call them all art. 
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vague and problematic, but it suggest a society in which free practice is the 
highest expression of humanity. 
SEDIMENTATION AND SUBJECTALITY 
When Marx approached the problem of the unity of thought and existence, 
he reversed it, according to Li. It's not that there is humanity on the one hand 
and nature on the other and that they are somehow unified. Rather, human 
thought and natural existence can only be thought of in terms of a humans' ma-
terial practice. Kant made the mistake of maintaining the Cartesian duality of 
mind as distinct from matter, conceiving mind as not only non-material, but as a 
result, also non-historical. Hegel introduced the important role of history, and 
the Marxists viewed humanity as creating itself out of nature. 
Li explains that from the very beginning, even before humans were fully 
human, there were practices, notably the making and using of tools. These tools 
were used to turn nature to the purpose of human survival. As the need for sur-
vival is itself a natural law, nothing supernatural enters the picture. Gradually, 
the mental faculties engaged in the using and making of tools build on them-
selves, creating more complex tools and widening the scope of "mere survival". 
Human consciousness and society become more complex, to the point of tools 
including cell phones and atomic clocks and human consciousness being 
marked by a tendency to involve abstract thought and artistic creativity. 
Eventually, human society transcended nature, developing into the various 
cultures with their diverse characteristics. Humans developed their own con-
sciousness and purposes in such a way that thought came to create the objective 
world, proof of the unity of thought and existence. It is also the origin of aes-
thetics and art. 
In articulating Marx, Li introduces some useful vocabulary. The free-floating 
Kantian subjectivity is given concrete form in the notion of psycho-cultural 
sedimentation. Like Marx, Li conflates the notions of practice, science, art, and 
industry. All are essential human life activities, in fact, they are not necessarily 
different activities at all. Li articulates them in terms of making and using tools, 
which he says was the earliest practice of proto-human beings. At the very ear-
liest stages, as humans began to use tools, the usage was objectified in the result 
and fed back into human rationality as part of nature. In all kinds of primitive 
manipulations, humans built up a consciousness that as a species gradually grew 
into the minds we have now. Human practice "sediments" into the mind. This 
occurs on a biological scale, a social/cultural scale, and an individual scale. 5 On 
the biological scale, this sedimentation has produced what Kant called the cate-
gories of understanding. On a cultural scale, it has produced all the various 
5 As pointed out by Jane Cauvel in her "The Transformative Power of Art: Li Zehou's Aes-
thetic Theory", Philosophy East and West, vol. 49, no. 2 (April 1999). 
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forms of customs and civilizations. And on an individual scale, it continues to 
affect the way we interact with the world around us. 
In this sense, subjectivity takes on a new meaning. Mou Zongsan noticed 
decades ago that in Chinese there are two words for "subjectivity". One, zhu-
guan (.:Efi) means "subjective" in the sense of opposition to objective. If peo-
ple have limited points of view, they are zhuguan. The other word, zhuti (.:EH), 
is used to refer to the embodied self, to view the world from human instantia-
tion, with a history, a culture, and lived experience. 6 Li tells us that he not only 
consciously chooses zhuti, for obvious reasons, in expressing subjectivity, but 
that in expressing it for his English speaking audiences, he even offers a neolo-
gism, "subjectality". 
AESTHETIC SEDIME NTATION 
As humans transform their nature through practices, in a kind of feedback 
loop, the human being transcends mere animal faculties, developing what Li 
terms superbiological powers. These include language, aesthetics, categories of 
understanding, tools, etc. These have their physiological basis, but they have 
also transformed us, he says, through subjecta!ity, into a nature beyond our 
original nature. 
Li introduces aesthetic sensibility as the most important of human faculties. 
Through the process of psycho-cultural sedimentation, aesthetic sensibility has 
transformed the way we view the world, such that even our most mundane prac-
tices take on aesthetic qualities: eating becomes dining, mating becomes love, 
etc. The humanizing of nature becomes the essence of beauty, and what are the 
activities of humanized nature but those that are free, that are liberated from all 
kinds of alienation. As in Kant, Li depends on aesthetics to unify truth and 
beauty, but he substitutes non-purposive human practice for the non-purposive 
teleology of Kant. 
Li emphasizes that the essence of humanity is not mechanical evolution or 
mysterious reason, but the product of practice. The same goes for the essence of 
beauty, which symbolizes the change of human practice on the world. 
FREEDOM AND POLITI CS 
Li's aesthetic philosophy is divided into beauty on the one hand and aes-
thetic sensibility on the other. Beauty is objective, the objectification of hu-
man practice. It is sensual freedom. Aesthetic sensibility is subjective, that 
faculty that allows us to apprehend beauty. It is free sensibility. Aesthetics 
brings the faculties of perception, understanding, imagination, and feeling into 
6 Mou, Zongsan, Zhongguo Zhexue de Tezhi cp~'tg*Ef:J!j;'j",1( [Characteristics of Chinese Phi-
losophy] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, reprinted in 1994), pp. 57-58. 
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free play, unifying the realm of truth (natural law, objective necessity) with 
goodness (social practice, subjective purpose). Beyond the notion of human 
practice, Li does not articulate a sense in which this unification occurs that is 
distinct from Kant's. Rather than a substrate that allows for the universaliza-
tion of taste and communication based on socialization, there is common hu-
manity, subjectality, as developed over time and universal to human beings. Li 
does not go into any technically psychological or anthropological details be-
yond this. Nor does he venture any details on how cultural and social 
sedimentation may play a part in creating different cognitive dynamics in 
different societies and cultures. 
Li's characterization of artistic sublimity is where he shows his stripes as a 
mainstream Marxist. For him, the conflict inherent in artistic sublimity is not a 
conflict of nature, but a symbol of the struggle for human liberation. In this 
sense, it is in neither nature nor the soul, as Kant takes it to be, but is in human 
practice. "The sublimity that art seeks to express is the warriors of the advance 
class, the struggle of a billion people, crushing forward, never surrendering, 
sacrificing all."7 Sublimity of nature, for Li, is recognized only after civilization 
has advanced to the point that humans have realized their own historical strug-
gle, and then when it is observed, it "calls forth fervor". 
Li never parts from this socialist conception of art. Even ugly art is an ex-
pression of alienation. And yet when Li mentions modern society, he calls it 
neither socialist nor communist, but capitalist. "Modern capitalist material 
civilization and consumer life are developing rapidly in society and con-
versely increase individual loneliness, anxiety, boredom, worry, purposeless-
ness, and fear." 8 In essence, Li says, we are back in the age of existentialism, 
when there is neither religion nor primitive society to fall back on. Facing our 
bare existence, we are left with the old Rousseauean dichotomy between civi-
lization and ethics. Li attributes the source of our social contradictions and 
fragmentation to all kinds of alienation. As the solution to this problem, Li 
refers us to stage three of Marx's five stages of communist dialectical devel-
opment, quoting Marx: 
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property, as human 
self-estrangement; communism therefore as the complete return of man to 
himself as a social (i.e. human) being-a return become conscious, and ac-
complished within the entire wealth of previous development. This commu-
nism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully devel-
oped humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict 
between man and nature and between man and man-the true resolution of 
7 Li, Zehou, Meixue Lunji ~,~HR,;'./t [Discourses on Aesthetics] (Taipei: Sanmin Shu ju 1996), 
p. 646. My translation (here and elsewhere) from Chinese. 
8 Ibid., p. 647. 
140 Brian Bruya 
the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-
confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and 
the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to 
be the solution. 
From here, Li refers to an ideally communist society of the future and then pro-
gresses on to the role of the individual in society. By fully developing oneself, 
by humanizing one's nature, a person can unify humanity and nature. This is the 
realm of freedom, for Li, the sphere of beauty. Without every mentioning 
Marx's stages explicitly, Li has moved us from the first through the third to the 
fifth. This final stage of socialism in which freedom is the ideal is also the es-
sence of Li's aesthetics. Li's philosophy is in fact a political aesthetics. This is 
not to take anything away from its profundity or to claim that it is for this rea-
son irrelevant to an external society. All philosophy is written from specific 
social and intellectual conditions, and Li's is no different. When we consider his 
philosophy, we will do best to consider it in its entirety. 
